Calibrating Model-Based Inferences and Decisions by Betancourt, Michael
Calibrating Model-Based Inferences
and Decisions
Michael Betancourt
Abstract. As the frontiers of applied statistics progress through increas-
ingly complex experiments we must exploit increasingly sophisticated
inferential models to analyze the observations we make. In order to
avoid misleading or outright erroneous inferences we then have to be
increasingly diligent in scrutinizing the consequences of those modeling
assumptions. Fortunately model-based methods of statistical inference
naturally define procedures for quantifying the scope of inferential out-
comes and calibrating corresponding decision making processes. In this
paper I review the construction and implementation of the particular
procedures that arise within frequentist and Bayesian methodologies.
Michael Betancourt is a research scientist at Symplectomorphic, LLC. (e-mail:
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As observations and experiments become more sophisticated, and we ask correspondingly
more detailed questions about the world around us, we must consider increasingly more
complex inferential models. The more complex the model, however, the more subtle the
corresponding inferences, and the decisions informed by those inferences, will behave.
Consequently understanding how inferences and decisions vary across the the many pos-
sible realizations of a measurement becomes a critical aspect in the design and preliminary
evaluation of new observational efforts. Such sensitivity analyses have a long history in the
applied sciences but they are often built upon heuristics. Fortunately, formal methods of
statistical inference naturally admit procedures for understanding and then calibrating the
inferential consequences of measurements within the scope of a statistical model. The ex-
act mathematical construction of this calibration, and the crucial implementation details,
depend critically on the exact form on inference that we consider.
In this paper I review how inferential outcomes are formally calibrated within both
the frequentist and Bayesian perspectives. I discuss not only the procedures but also the
conceptual and practical challenges in implementing these procedures in practice, and
demonstrate their application towards calibrating traditional discovery and limit setting
results.
1. MATHEMATICAL PRELIMINARIES
In order to be as explicit as possible when introducing new functions I will use the
conventional mathematical notation. A function, f , that maps points x in a space X to
points y = f(x) in a space Y is denoted
f : X → Y
x 7→ f(x).
The real number line will be denoted R with the N -dimensional real numbers denoted
RN .
Sets of objects are denoted with curly braces, {. . .}, and a vertical line in between braces
denotes a selection condition which defines a set. For example,
{x ∈ X | f(x) = 0}
defines the subset of points in X that satisfies the condition f(x) = 0.
Finally,
x ∼ pi(x)
implies that the space X 3 x is endowed with the probability distribution, pi. If the left-
hand side is decorated with a tilde,
x˜ ∼ pi(x)
then this implies that x˜ is a sample from the probability distribution pi.
4 BETANCOURT
Inferences and
Decisions
Observation, y˜
Measurement Process
Space of observations, Y
True data generating process, pi∗
Latent System
Being Studied
Fig 1. Inference is an inductive process that aims to quantify which phenomenological behaviors of a latent
system are consistent with measured observations. Formally we assume that the measurement process defines
a space of observations, Y , and a probability distribution quantifying the variation in those observations, pi∗.
Any realization of the measurement process results in an observation, y˜, from which we base our inferences
about the latent system and any resulting decisions about how to interact with the latent system.
2. INFERENCE
Ultimately statistics is a tool to learn about the phenomenological behavior of some
latent system, for example the internal structure and dynamics of a subatomic particle,
the phenotypical encoding of a genome, or the response of a population of individuals
to a particular stimulus. Although we cannot observe these phenomena directly we can
probe them through measurements of the system, or more precisely measurements of how
the system interacts with a surrounding environment. These experimental probes can be
passive, assembling and analyzing data collected for other purposes, or active, collecting
data from dedicated experiments.
Formally any measurement process defines a measurement space, Y , containing all of the
possible realizations of a measurement. These realizations, or observations are inherently
stochastic, varying from measurement to measurement. If we assume that this variation is
sufficiently well-behaved, then we can mathematically quantify it with a probability distri-
bution over Y . I will refer to any probability distribution over the measurement space as a
data generating process. Under this assumption observations of a given system are modeled
as independent samples from some true data generating process, pi∗.
Inference is any procedure that uses observations to inform our understanding of the
latent system and its behaviors (Figure 1). Because of the inherent stochasticity of the
measurement process, however, any finite observation will convey only limited information.
Consequently inference fundamentally concerns itself with quantifying the uncertainty in
this understanding.
In particular, there will be many phenomenological behaviors consistent with a given
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observation and, in general, those behaviors that appear most consistent will vary along
with the form of the observation itself. Here I will define the sensitivity of an experiment
as the distribution of inferential outcomes induced by the variation in the observations.
Ideally our inferences would be accurate and capture the true behavior of the latent system
regardless of the details of particular observation, but there are no generic guarantees.
Consequently in practice we must be careful to study these sensitivities with respect to our
inferential goals.
Sensitivity analyses become even more important when we consider decisions informed by
our inferences. Conventions in many fields focus not on reporting uncertainties but rather
making explicit claims about the latent system being studied. These claims commonly
take the form of discovery, where a particular phenomenon is claimed to exist or not exist.
In order to limit the possibility that we falsely claim to have discovered the presence, or
absence, of a phenomenon we have to carefully consider the sensitivity of these claims.
Decisions, however, are not always so obvious. Even the simple presentation of our
inferences requires implicit decisions in the form of how we summarize and communicate
our results. To ensure that we are not biasing our audience or ourselves we have to consider
how this presentation would vary with the underlying observations.
Ultimately, in order to ensure robust analyses we have to carefully calibrate the conse-
quences of our inferences. First consider a set of actions that we can take, a ∈ A. Assuming
a perfect characterization of the latent system of interest we could theoretically quantify
the relative loss of taking a given action with the true loss function,
L∗ :A→ R
a 7→ L∗(a).
If we convolving this loss function with an inferential decision-making process that maps
observations to actions,
aˆ :Y → A
y 7→ aˆ(y),
we induces a true inferential loss function,
L∗aˆ :Y → R
y 7→ L∗(aˆ(y)).
More optimistic readers might also consider the equivalent utility function, U∗(a) ≡ −L∗(a).
A sensitivity analysis considers the distribution of L∗aˆ(y) with varying observations, y,
while a calibration considers expected values of the loss function over the possible obser-
vations. For example, we might aim to calibrate an experiment to ensure that the average
loss is below a certain value or that a particular quantile of the loss distribution is below
a certain value.
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Fig 2. (a) The true data generating process, pi∗, belongs in the space of all possible data generating processes
over the measurement space, PY . (b) Model-based inferences consider a model configuration space,M, which
contains only a limited subset of all of those possible data generating processes.
These analyses, however, require that we know both the true behavior of the latent
system, so that we can quantify the relative loss of each action, and the true data generating
process, so that we can quantify the variation of possible observations. In practice we don’t
know the true nature of the latent system or the true data generating process of the
resulting measurements, but we can model them. Statistical models quantify the scope of
possible data generating processes, allowing us to quantify the sensitivity of inferences and
then construct formal calibrations within that scope.
3. MODEL-BASED SENSITIVITIES AND CALIBRATION
Inferences that explicitly model the measurement process, or model-based inferences,
naturally define the scope of the possible observations, leaving practitioners to employ
their domain expertise to construct relevant loss functions.
In this section I review the model configuration space that underlies model-based infer-
ence and how the frequentist and Bayesian paradigms utilize this space to define inference
and calibrate inferential outcomes.
3.1 The Model Configuration Space
A statistical model establishes a model configuration space, or a collection of data gener-
ating processes. Ideally the model configuration space is designed to be sufficiently rich to
either contain the true data generating process or, more realistically, contain data generat-
ing processes sufficiently similar to the true data generating process within the resolution
of our experimental probe (Figure 2). Each individual data generating process in the model
configuration space will be denoted a model configuration.
Typically the model configuration space admits a parameterization in which each model
configuration can be identified with a parameter value, θ ∈ Θ. Often these parameters
decompose into components,
θ = {θ1, . . . , θN}
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Model Configuration Space,
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Fig 3. In model based inference the measurement process is modeled with a model configuration space, Θ.
Inferences identify which model configurations, θ ∈ Θ, are consistent with a given observation, which then
informs the properties of the true data generating process and the latent system under investigation.
with each component responsible for quantifying only one aspect of the phenomenologi-
cal behavior of the latent system, the environment containing the latent system, or the
measurement process itself. Such parameter decompositions make the model configuration
space particularly interpretable.
Moreover, if each model configuration admits a density with respect to a common ref-
erence measure over Y then we can fully specify the model configuration space with the
family of densities pi(y | θ) for y ∈ Y and θ ∈ Θ. In many applied fields this family of
densities, or even the model configuration space itself, is introduced as the likelihood. Un-
fortunately, that term has a more precise definition in the statistics literature: the phrase
likelihood is used exclusively to denote the function over the parameter space given by
evaluating each density at a particular measurement y˜ ∈ Y ,
Ly˜ : Θ→ R
θ 7→ pi(y˜ | θ).
Consequently I will avoid the use of likelihood unless the model configuration densities are
explicitly being evaluated at a given observation.
Once we have constructed a model configuration space, inference becomes a means of
identifying those model configurations that are consistent with an observation (Figure
3). Because there is no unique definition of this sort of consistency, there are multiple
approaches to inference. The two employed most in practice are frequentist and Bayesian
inference.
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3.2 Model-Based Loss Functions
Given a means of quantifying those model configurations consistent with an observation,
we can use that quantification to motivate fruitful decisions about how to best interact with
the latent system. For example we may want to intervene with the system or systems like
it, introducing a treatment or altering the surrounding environment. Alternatively we may
want to decide on whether or not to claim the discovery of the absence or presence of a
new phenomenon, or whether or not to follow up with another experiment.
For model-based inference we can quantify the utility of a set of actions by defining a
loss function for each possible data generating process in our model,
L :A×Θ→ R
(a, θ) 7→ L(a, θ).
Given an inferential decision making process
aˆ :Y → A
y 7→ aˆ(y),
we can then define a model-based inferential loss function,
Laˆ :Y ×Θ→ R
(y, θ) 7→ L(aˆ(y), θ).
Presuming that the true data generating process is contained within the model configu-
ration space, sensitivity analyses and calibration within the scope of our model quantifies
the actual performance of our decisions. When the true data generating process is close to
the model configuration space then this process approximates the actual performance.
That said, constructing a loss function alone is insufficient to admit sensitivity analyses
and calibrations. Before the measurement we are ignorant of not only what the observation
will be, and hence what action we will take, but also which model configuration gives the
true data generating process. In order to quantify the performance of our decisions we have
to define the scope of possible observations and possible data generating processes. Exactly
how we do that depends intimately on the formal details of the inferences that we make.
3.3 Sensitivity and Calibration of Frequentist Inference
Frequentist inference (Casella and Berger, 2002; Lehmann and Casella, 2006; Keener,
2011) derives from the interpretation that probability theory can model only the frequencies
of repeatable processes. This definition is consistent with the use of probabilities to model
the inherent variation of observations, but it does not allow us to define probabilities over
the model configuration space itself, as those probabilities would not correspond to the
hypothetical frequencies of any repeatable process. Ultimately this strong philosophical
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assumption implies that we cannot use any form of weighting to quantify consistency in
the model configuration space because any self-consistent weighting is equivalent to the
assignment of probabilities!
Consequently frequentist inference must take the form of definite decisions about which
parts of the model configuration space are consistent with an observation and which are
not. From a frequentist perspective inference and decisions are one in the same! Because
such definite decisions can readily exclude the true data generating process, or model
configurations close to the true data generating process, from consideration we have to
carefully calibrate these decisions so that such exclusions are sufficiently rare.
Ultimately frequentist inference does not define exactly how an observation informs
which parts of the model configuration space to keep and which to discard. Rather fre-
quentist inference establishes a means of calibrating any such procedure that might be
considered.
3.3.1 Frequentist Inference Any procedure that consumes an observation to produce a
definite decision about which parts of the model configuration space are considered con-
sistent takes the mathematical form of an estimator. Estimators are functions from the
measurement space to subsets of the model configuration space, mapping observations to
subsets of model configurations,
θˆ : Y → T ,
where T is the space of well-defined subsets of the model configuration space, Θ.
A common class of estimators are point estimators that identify a single point in the
model configuration space (Figure 4a),
θˆ : Y → Θ,
Point estimators formalize the intuition of a “best fit”, where inferences are summarized
with a single point at the expense of ignoring the uncertainty inherent in learning from
finite observations.
The more general class of estimators that identify entire subsets of the model configu-
ration space are known as confidence sets (Figure 4b), or confidence intervals if the model
configuration space is one-dimensional. The nomenclature is meant to suggest that if a
confidence set has been properly constructed then we can be confident that these sets will
contain the true data generating process for sufficiently many observations.
3.3.2 The Frequentist Calibration Criterion The actual choice of which estimator to
employ in a given analysis is left to the practitioner. Constraints that enforce desired
properties can be imposed to restrict the space of potential estimators, but the choice of
these desired properties remains the responsibility of the practitioner. Regardless of how
we ultimately select an estimator, however, we can use the model configuration space to
calibrate the estimator and determine it’s practical utility.
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Fig 4. (a) Point estimators identify a single model configuration, θˆ(y˜), that is ideally close to the true data
generating process, θ∗, for any given observation y˜. (b) Confidence sets identify entire subsets of the model
configuration space that ideally contain the true data generating process for any given observation.
In frequentist inference our actions are definite quantifications of the model configuration
space and, by construction, estimators are inferential decision making processes. In order
to define a calibration criterion we we must first construct a model-based loss function,
L(θˆ, θ),
that quantifies how well θˆ identifies the true data generating process, θ. Substituting an
estimator yields the model-based inferential loss function,
Lθˆ(y, θ) ≡ L(θˆ(y), θ).
As with estimators there is no canonical loss function in frequentist inference; instead
one must be chosen using whatever domain expertise is available within the context of a
particular analysis. In practice this choice often considers the structure of the estimator
itself.
If we knew that a given θ identified the true data generating process then the sensitivity
of the loss of the estimator over the possible observations could be summarized with an
expectation over that configuration. This expectation yields an expected loss for each model
configuration,
Lθˆ(θ) =
∫
Y
dy pi(y | θ)Lθˆ(y, θ).
Because we don’t have any information about which model configuration identifies the
true data generating process before a measurement is made, the frequentist calibration
criterion is defined as the maximum expected loss over all possible model configurations,
L¯θˆ = maxθ
Lθˆ(θ).
If the model configuration space is sufficiently rich that it contains the true data generating
process, then this calibration criterion defines the worst case loss of our given estimator.
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Bounding the worst case loss of an estimator is an extremely powerful guarantee on its
practical performance, but also a very conservative one as bounds can be dominated by
unrealistic but not impossible data generating processes towards the boundaries of the
model configuration space.
A natural loss function for point estimators is the Lp distance between the estimated
model configuration and the presumed true data generating process,
Lp
θˆ
(y, θ) = ((θ − θˆ(y))2)p/2.
The expected Lp=2 loss is known as the variance of an estimator.
Similarly, a natural natural loss function for confidence sets is inclusion of the presumed
true data generating process,
Lθˆ(y, θ) = Iθ[θˆ(y)],
where the indicator function, I, is defined as
Iθ[T ] =
{
1, θ ∈ T
0, else
.
The expected inclusion loss, or coverage is simply how often the confidence set contains
the presumed true data generating process.
While this calibration procedure can used to analyze the frequentist properties of a
given estimator, they can also be used to optimize the choice of estimator. Given a family
of estimators, {θˆx}, the optimal estimator will satisfy the minimax criterion,
θˆ∗ = argmin
x
L∗
θˆx
= argmin
x
max
θ
Lθˆx(θ)
= argmin
x
max
θ
∫
Y
dy pi(y | θ)Lθˆx(y, θ).
For example, a desired coverage might be established initially and then a confidence set
engineered to ensure that the coverage is met, or exceeded, for all of the data generating
processes in the model configuration space.
3.3.3 Frequentist Methods in Practice Aside from the conceptual challenge of choosing
a loss function that enforces the needs of a given analysis, the computational burden of
frequentist calibration is a significant impediment to its application. In particular, even
approximately scanning through the model configuration space to identify the maximal
expected loss often requires more computational resources than realistically available to a
practitioner.
Many frequentist analyses assume sufficiently simple model configuration spaces, esti-
mators, and loss functions such that the maximum expected loss can be computed ana-
lytically. The analytic results allow, for example, optimal estimators to be chosen from
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families of candidate estimators with strong guarantees on the performance of the best
choice. The practical validity of these guarantees, however, requires that the true data
generating process be simple enough that it can be contained within the relatively crude
model configuration space. For the complex experiments of applied interest this can be a
dangerous assumption.
Without analytic results one might consider interpolative methods that bound the varia-
tion in the expected loss between a grid of points distributed across the model configuration
space. At each of these points Monte Carlo methods can be used to simulate observations
and approximate the expected loss, and then the properties of the loss function itself can
be used to interpolate the expected loss amidst the grid points. These methods can yield
reasonable results for low-dimensional model configuration spaces, but as the dimensional-
ity of the model increases even strong smoothness assumptions can become insufficient to
inform how to interpolate between the grid points.
In order to avoid this curse of dimensionality frequentist analyses unaccommodating to
analytic results often resort to asymptotics. Asymptotic analyses assume that the model
configuration space is sufficiently regular that as we consider more observations at once
the behavior of the model configuration space follows a central limit theorem. Under these
conditions the likelihood for any observation concentrates in an increasingly small neigh-
borhood around the maximum likelihood estimator,
θML(y) = argmax
θ∈Θ
pi(y˜ | θ).
Moreover, in this limit the breadth of that neighborhood is given by the inverse of the
Fisher information matrix,
I(y˜) = ∇2pi(y˜ | θ)∣∣
θ=θML(y)
.
The concentration in the model configuration space in this asymptotic limit admits conve-
nient analytic approximations to the frequentist calibration procedure.
Asymptotic behavior also motivates the concept of profiling, which is of use when the
parameter space separates into phenomenological parameters related to the underlying
system of interest and nuisance or systematic parameters that are unrelated to that sys-
tem but still effect the data generating process. Under certain conditions the observations
inform the nuisance parameters faster than the the phenomenological parameters; in the
asymptotic limit the uncertainty in these parameters becomes negligible and they can be
replaced with conditional maximum likelihood estimates.
More formally, if the parameterization of the model configuration space decomposes into
phenomenological parameters, ϑ, and nuisance parameters, σ, then we define the condi-
tional maximum likelihood estimator as
σˆ(ϑ, y˜) = argmax
σ
pi(y˜ | ϑ, σ)
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and the corresponding profile likelihood as
pˆi(y˜ | ϑ) = pi(y˜ | ϑ, σˆ(ϑ, y˜)).
The profile likelihood can then be used to calibrate estimators of the phenomenological
parameters, at least in this limit.
The utility of these asymptotic methods depends critically on the structure of the model
configuration space and its behavior as we consider more observations. Simpler models
typically converge to the asymptotic limit faster and hence require fewer data for asymp-
totic calibrations to be reasonably accurate. More complex models, however, converge more
slowly and may require more data than is practical, or they may not satisfy the necessary
conditions to converge at all.
Consequently it is crucial to explicitly verify that the asymptotic regime has been reached
in a given analysis. As with analytic methods, one has to be especially careful to not
employ an over-simplistic model to facilitate the applicability of the asymptotic results
while compromising the practical validity of the resulting calibration.
3.4 Sensitivity and Calibration of Bayesian Inference
Bayesian inference (Bernardo and Smith, 2009; Gelman et al., 2014) broadens the inter-
pretation of probability theory, allowing it to be used to not only model inherent variation
in observations but also provide a probabilistic quantification of consistency between the
data generating processes in the model configuration space and observations.
This generalization manifests in a unique procedure for constructing inferences which can
then be used to inform decisions. Ultimately Bayesian inference decouples inference from
decision making, making the assumptions underlying both more explicit and often easier
to communicate. Moreover, the fully probabilistic treatment of the Bayesian perspective
immediate defines a procedure for constructing sensitivities and calibrations.
3.4.1 Bayesian Inference Bayesian inference compliments the data generating processes
in the model configuration space with a prior distribution over the model configuration
space itself. The prior distribution quantifies any information on which model configura-
tions are closer to the true data generating process than others that is available before a
measurement is made. This information can come from, for example, physical considera-
tions, previous experiments, or even expert elicitation. Careful choices of the prior distribu-
tion can go a long way towards regularizing unwelcome behavior of the model configuration
space.
Together the model configuration space and the prior distribution define the Bayesian
joint distribution over the measurement space and the parameter space,
pi(y, θ) = pi(y | θ)pi(θ).
The titular Bayes’ Theorem conditions this joint distribution on an observation, y˜, to give
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Fig 5. (a) Bayesian inference begins with a prior distribution, shown here in dark red, over the model
configuration space,M, that quantifies information available before a measurement. (b) Information encoded
in an observation updates the prior distribution into a posterior distribution that ideally concentrates around
the true data generating process, pi∗.
the posterior distribution,
pi(θ | y˜) = pi(y˜, θ)
pi(y˜)
∝ pi(y˜ | θ)pi(θ).
In words, the prior distribution quantifies information available before the measurement,
the model configuration space decodes the information within an observations, and the
posterior distribution combines both sources of information to quantify the information
about the latent system being studies after a measurement (Figure 5).
Any well-posed statistical query we might make of our system reduces to interroga-
tions of the posterior distribution. Mathematically this must take the form of a posterior
expectation for some function, f ,
E[f ] =
∫
Θ
dθ pi(θ | y˜) f(θ).
For example, we might consider the posterior mean or median to identify where the pos-
terior is concentrating or the posterior standard deviation or the posterior quartiles to
quantify the breadth of the distribution.
Posterior expectations also define a unique decision making process in Bayesian inference.
First we define the expected loss for a given action by averaging a model-based loss function,
L(a, θ), over the posterior distribution,
L(a, y˜) =
∫
Θ
dθ pi(θ | y˜)L(a, θ).
We can then define a decision making process by taking the action with the smallest
expected loss,
a∗(y˜) = min
a∈A
L(a, y˜).
MODEL-BASED CALIBRATION 15
For example, our decision might be to summarize the posterior with a single “best fit”
model configuration, θˆ. Given the loss function
L(θˆ, θ) = (θˆ − θ)2
the expected losses for each possible summary becomes
L(θˆ, y˜) = (θˆ − µ(y˜)) + σ2(y˜),
where µ(y˜) is the posterior mean and σ(y˜) is the posterior standard deviation. Following
the Bayesian decision making process, our optimal decision is to summarize our posterior
by reporting the posterior mean, θˆ∗(y˜) = µ(y˜).
3.4.2 The Bayesian Calibration Criterion Bayes’ Theorem provides a unique procedure
for constructing inferences and making subsequent decisions given an observation, but there
are no guarantees that these decisions will achieve any desired performance for any possi-
ble observation. Consequently sensitivity analysis and calibration of this decision making
process across possible is still important in Bayesian inference.
Instead of having to consider each model configuration equally, however, the prior dis-
tribution allows us to diminish the effect of unrealistic but not impossible model configura-
tions. In particular sampling from the joint distribution generates an ensemble of reasonable
data generating process and corresponding observations which we can use to quantify the
performance of our decisions.
For example, we can quantify the sensitivity of any inferential outcome by integrating
the model configurations out of the Bayesian joint to give the prior data generating process,
pi(y) =
∫
Θ
dθ pi(y, θ) =
∫
Θ
dθ pi(y | θ)pi(θ).
The prior data generating process probabilistically aggregates the behaviors of all of the
possible data generating process in the model configuration space into a single probability
distribution over the measurement space. We can then analyze the sensitivity of any in-
ferential outcome by running our analysis over an ensemble of observations sampled from
this distribution.
Moreover, we can calibrate a decision making process by integrating a model-based loss
function against the full Bayesian joint distribution,
L¯A =
∫
Y,Θ
dy dθ Laˆ(y, θ)pi(θ, y).
This calibration immediately quantifies the expected loss as both the observations and data
generating processes vary within the scope of our model.
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3.4.3 Bayesian Methods in Practice The unified probabilistic treatment of Bayesian in-
ference ensures that all calculations take the form of expectation values with respect the
Bayesian joint distribution, its marginals, such as the prior distribution and the prior data
generating process, or its conditionals, such as the posterior distribution. Consequently
calculating expectation values, or more realistically accurately estimating them, is the sole
computational burden of Bayesian inference.
Posterior expectations are challenging to compute, and indeed much of the effort on
the frontiers of statistical research concerns the development and understanding of ap-
proximation methods. One of the most powerful and well-understood of these is Markov
chain Monte Carlo (Robert and Casella, 1999; Brooks et al., 2011) and its state of the art
implementations like Hamiltonian Monte Carlo (Betancourt, 2017).
On the other hand, expectations with respect to the Bayesian joint distribution are
often amenable to much simpler Monte Carlo methods. In particular, if we can draw exact
samples from the prior distribution and each of the data generating processes in the model
configuration space then we can generate joint samples with the sequential sampling scheme
θ˜ ∼ pi(θ)
y˜ ∼ pi(y | θ˜).
For each simulated observation, y˜, we can construct a subsequent posterior distribution,
make posterior-informed decisions, and then compare those decisions to the simulated
truth, θ˜. As we generate a larger sample from the Bayesian joint distribution we can more
accurately quantify our sensitivities and calibrations.
We can also quantify how sensitivity a calibration is to a particular component of the
parameter space, ϑ, by sampling the complementary parameters, σ, from the corresponding
conditional prior distribution,
σ˜ ∼ pi(σ | ϑ)
y˜ ∼ pi(y | (ϑ, σ˜)).
This allows us, for example, to see how our decision making process behaves as for various
phenomenlogical behaviors.
Interestingly, the application of Monte Carlo to the Bayesian joint distribution is not
at all dissimilar to many of the heuristic schemes common in the sciences. Sampling y˜ ∼
pi(y | θ˜) just simulates the experiment conditioned on the model configuration, θ˜. The
addition step θ ∼ pi(θ) simply simulates model configurations consistent with the given
prior information instead of selecting a few model configuration by hand.
One inferential outcome immediately amenable to calibration is the approximation of
posterior expectations themselves. Cook, Gelman and Rubin (2006), for example, introduce
a natural way to calibrate the estimation of any posterior quantiles. This then immediately
provides a procedure for quantifying the accuracy of any algorithm that yields deterministic
approximations to posterior quantiles, for example as demonstrated in Yao et al. (2018).
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Bayesian sensitivity analysis is particularly useful for identifying known pathologies in
Bayesian inference by carefully examining the simulated analyses. Consider, for example,
the posterior z-score for the parameter component, θ˜n,
zn =
∣∣∣∣∣µn(y˜)− θ˜nσn(y˜)
∣∣∣∣∣ ,
where µn(y˜) denotes the posterior mean of θ˜n and σn(y˜) the corresponding posterior stan-
dard deviation. The posterior z-score quantifies how much the posterior distribution en-
velops the presumed true data generating process along this direction in parameter space.
At the same time consider the posterior shrinkage of that parameter component,
sn = 1− σ
2
n(y˜)
τ2n(y˜)
,
were τn(y˜) is the prior standard deviation of θ˜n. The posterior shrinkage quantifies how
much the posterior distribution contracts from the initial prior distribution.
An ideal experiment is extremely informative, with large shrinkage for every observation,
while also being accurate, with small z-scores for every observation. In this case the distri-
bution of posteriors derived from prior predictive observations should concentrate towards
small z-scores and large posterior shrinkages for each parameter component. On the other
hand, small posterior shrinkage indicates an experiment that poorly identifies the given
parameter component, while large z-scores indicates inferences biased away from the true
data generating process.
We can readily visualize this behavior by plotting the posterior z- score verses the pos-
terior shrinkage. Concentration to the top right of this plot indicates overfitting, while
concentration to the top left indicates a poorly-chosen prior that biases the model configu-
ration space away from the presumed true data generating process (Figure 6a). Because the
Bayesian joint distribution considers only those true data generating consistent with the
prior, however, this latter behavior should be impossible within the scope of a model-based
sensitivity analysis.
By investigating this simple summary we can quickly identify problems with our ex-
perimental design (Figure 6b, c). A scatter plot that combines the outcomes for all of
the parameters components into one plot first summarizes the aggregate performance of
the entire model, and then individual plots for each parameter component can be used to
isolate the source of any noted pathological behavior.
3.5 Limitations of Model-Based Calibration
The ultimate limitation of model-based calibration is its dependence on the model con-
figuration space. Any model-based sensitivities or guarantees claimed by model-based cal-
ibrations rely on the model configuration space being rich enough to capture the true data
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Fig 6. (a) The distribution of posterior z-scores and posterior shrinkages with respect to the Bayesian joint
distribution identifies well-known pathologies of Bayesian inference. The sensitivity of the posterior to the
observations within the scope of a given model can be summarized by sampling from the Bayesian joint
distribution, constructing posteriors, and then plotting the corresponding posterior z-scores and shrinkages.
(b) This model demonstrates good behavior for most observations, with a small tail of outcomes that overfit
to a few observations. (c) This model is weakly identified, with the information introduced by the data doing
little to improve upon the information encoded in the prior distribution.
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generating process, or at least contain model configurations that approximate it sufficiently
well.
Unfortunately it is difficult to quantify how these guarantees might change as the as the
model configurations become worse approximations to the true data generating process.
Consequently it is up to the user to verify the sufficiency of the assumed model configuration
space with, for example, predictive validations such as residual analysis for frequentist point
estimators or posterior predictive checks for Bayesian analyses.
Another point of fragility of model-based sensitivity and calibrations is that they apply
only for the exact models and decisions being considered. If those models or decisions are
tweaked then the guarantees no longer need apply. The only way to ensure valid calibrations
is to recompute them every time the experiment is modified. An consequence of this fragility
is that any sensitivity or calibration is suspect whenever the construction of the model
itself depends on the observed data! The only rigorous way to maintain the validity of
these results is to consider a larger model that incorporates this implicit dependence of the
model configuration space on the observed data.
Because observations are often used to critique and ultimately tune the model, this vul-
nerability is almost impossible to avoid in practice. Consequently model-based calibration
is perhaps best considered as a tool for identifying poorly inferential behaviors in a model
rather than making absolute guarantees about its performance.
4. CALIBRATING DISCOVERY CLAIMS
One of the most common decisions made in the applied sciences is whether or not to
claim that a phenomenon in the system being studied exists or doesn’t exist. Whether such
discovery claims are good scientific practice is debatable, but given their prevalence it is
important to be able to calibrate these decisions regardless.
Many decision making processes have been developed within in both statistics and ap-
plied fields, and many of these methods have come under recent scrutiny given their failure
to replicate in subsequent experiments. The underlying issue in these failed replications is
often poor calibration of the original discovery claim.
In this section I review how discovery claims can be constructed from a statistical model
both in the frequentist and Bayesian paradigms and discuss some of the practical issues
with their calibration.
4.1 Partitioning the Model Configuration Space
In order to decide on the presence of a phenomenon we need to partition the model
configuration space into those model configurations that are influenced by the phenomenon
and those that are not. For example we might partition the model configuration space into
data generating processes containing only background sources and those containing both
signal and background sources. Alternatively we might consider a partition into model
configurations where two phenomena manifest distinct behaviors and those where they
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behave identically. Discovery claims are then informed by which of the two partitions is
more consistent with the observed data.
Let the phenomenon of interest be characterized with a subset of parameters, ϑ = $(θ),
where $ projects the total parameter space onto the phenomenological parameters of
interest. Additionally assume that the parameters are structured such that ϑ = 0 identifies
those data generating processes not influenced by the phenomenon being considered. In
this case the model configuration space partitions into an absence model
Θ1 = {θ ∈ Θ | $(θ) = 0} ,
and a complementary presence model,
Θ2 = {θ ∈ Θ | $(θ) 6= 0}
(Figure 7). This includes the case where ϑ is constrained to be positive, in which case the
presence model reduces to θ > 0, or the more general case where ϑ is unconstrained and
the presence model includes all positive and negative, but non-zero, parameters.
For example, consider a model where our observations are generated from overlapping
signal and background sources, µs and µb respectively, with Gaussian measurement vari-
ability σ. This yields the model configuration space
pi(y | µs, µb, σ) = N (y | µs + µb, σ).
If we are interested in understanding the signal then we would consider the projection
µs = ϑ = $(µs, µb, σ),
with the absence model defined as µs = 0, regardless of the value of the nuisance parameters
µb and σ, and the presence model as the complement with µs 6= 0.
Because we don’t know which of the two partitions contains the true data generating
process we have to calibrate our decisions with respect to both. In particular we have to
consider the probability of claiming a discovery when the true data generating process is
in the presence model and when it is in the absence model. We can fully characterize the
four possible outcomes with two probabilities: the false discovery rate, FDR and the true
discovery rate, TDR (Table 1). In classical statistics the false discovery rate is also known
as the Type I error while one minus the true discovery rate is also known as the Type II
error.
Given these probabilities we can compute the expected loss once we have assigned losses
to the possible decision outcomes. For example, let L1 be the loss associated with claiming
a discovery when the true data generating process is in the absence model and L2 the
possibly negative loss associated with claiming a discovery when the true data generating
process is in the presence model. The expected loss for claiming a discovery is then given
by
Lclaim discovery = (1− FDR)L1 + TDRL2.
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Full Model
ϑ < 0 ϑ = 0 ϑ > 0
Presence Model
ϑ < 0 ϑ > 0
Absence Model
ϑ = 0
Fig 7. When claiming a discovery we first identify the phenomenological parameters, ϑ, which quantify
the behavior of a phenomena of interest. The remaining nuisance parameters quantify the behavior of the
environment in which the phenomenon interacts and the the measurement process itself. When ϑ = 0
identifies a vanishing phenomenon we can partition the full model configuration space into an absence
model of those model configurations satisfying ϑ = 0 and a presence model of those model configurations
satisfying ϑ 6= 0. Discovery is claimed when the presence model is strongly preferred over the absence model
by an observation, for various definitions of “preferred”.
Truth Decision
Claim θ∗ ∈ Θ1 Claim θ∗ ∈ Θ2
θ∗ ∈ Θ1 (No Phenomenon) FDR 1− FDR
θ∗ ∈ Θ2 (Phenomenon) 1− TDR TDR
Table 1
When preparing to claim a discovery we have to consider the range of inferential outcomes both for when
the true data generating process, θ∗, is an element of the absence model, θ∗ ∈ Θ1, and when it is an
element of the presence model, θ∗ ∈ Θ2. Given the false discovery rate, FDR, and true discovery rate,
TDR, we can compute any expected loss with respect to the claiming a discovery or not.
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Truth Decision
Claim θ∗ ∈ Θ1 Claim θ∗ ∈ Θ2 Claim Nothing
θ∗ ∈ Θ1 (No Phenomenon) p1 p2 p3
θ∗ ∈ Θ2 (Phenomenon) p′1 p′2 p′3
Table 2
A decision process where we can avoid making any claim about the phenomenon of interest by not
publishing our analysis is characterized by six probabilities, four of which are independent because of the
normalization constraints,
∑3
n=1 pn = 1 and
∑3
n=1 p
′
n = 1.
In practice we need not limit ourselves to dichotomous decisions. We could also consider
a decision process that claims the phenomenon exists, claims the phenomenon doesn’t exist,
or makes no claim at all. This process would be characterized by six probabilities, four of
which are independent (Table 2). Importantly the expected loss of a discovery claim can
be miscalculated if we ignore the possibility that an analysis may not be reported for some
observations and the two additional degrees of freedom needed to quantify the expected
loss in this more general circumstance.
4.2 Frequentist Null Hypothesis Significance Testing
The conventional approach to claiming discoveries in a frequentist framework is the
null hypothesis significance testing framework. Here the null hypothesis that the true data
generating process falls into the absence model is treated as something of a strawman set
up to be rejected by observation. In order to reject the null hypothesis we consider how
extreme an observation is with respect to the model configurations in the absence model.
The more extreme our rejection threshold the smaller the false discovery rate should be.
Naively, if the null hypothesis is rejected then we are left with only the alternative
hypothesis that the true data generating process falls into the presence model. That said,
we can’t simply reject the null hypothesis in isolation — a poor fit to the null hypothesis
does not imply that the alternative hypothesis is any more consistent with the observation!
At the very least we have to consider also how likely we are to reject the null hypothesis
when the alternative hypothesis is true.
Exactly how the null hypothesis significance testing framework is implemented depends
on the structure of the null and alternative hypotheses. The procedure is straightforward for
simple hypotheses but quickly becomes difficult to implement in practice as the hypotheses
become more complex.
4.2.1 Point Hypotheses The simplest case of null hypothesis significance testing is when
both the null hypothesis and alternative hypothesis are point hypotheses consisting of a
single model configuration each. In this case we’ll denote the lone data generating processes
in the absence model piN (y) and the lone data generating process in the precence model
piA(y).
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For a point null hypothesis we can quantify the extremity of an observation, y˜, with a
tail probability or p-value,
p(y˜) =
∫ ∞
y˜
dy piN (y).
The integral might be computed analytically or with numerical methods such as quadrature
for low-dimensional measurement spaces and Monte Carlo for high-dimensional measure-
ment spaces.
If we reject the null hypothesis when
p(y˜) < 1− α
for some significance, α, then by construction the false discovery rate of our claim will be
FDR =
∫
Y
dy piN (y) I [ p(y) < 1− α]
=
∫ 1
0
dp˜ I [ p˜ < 1− α]
= 1− α.
By tuning the significance of the null hypothesis test we can immediately achieve whatever
false discovery rate is desired in a given application.
The true discovery rate, also known as the power of the null hypothesis test, is the
average null p-value with respect to the alternative data generating process,
TDR = β = 1−
∫
Y
dy piA(y) p(y).
Provided that the power is sufficiently high, observations for which the null hypothesis
is rejected will be more consistent with the alternative hypothesis in expectation. There
is no guarantee, however, that the alternative will actually be more consistent for every
observation.
Unlike the false discovery rate, the true discovery rate is a consequence of the assumed
model and cannot be tuned once a significance has been set. Consequently unsatisfactorily
low true discovery rates can be remedied only by modifying the experimental circumstances,
for example by increasing the number of observations included in each measurement.
4.2.2 Point Null Hypotheses and Complex Alternative Hypotheses Null hypothesis sig-
nificance testing becomes more complicated when the model configuration space no longer
consists of just two data generating processes and both hypotheses cannot be point hy-
potheses. Consider next the situation where the null hypothesis is still given by a single
data generating process, θ = 0, and the alternative hypothesis contains the remaining
model configurations θ 6= 0. This might arise, for example, when our model contains only
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one phenomenological parameter and θ = 0 uniquely defines the circumstance where the
phenomenon is absent.
As before we can define the p-value,
p(y˜) =
∫ ∞
y˜
dy pi(y | θ = 0),
and then reject the null hypothesis when
p(y˜) < 1− α
to ensure a given false discovery rate.
Unfortunately there is no longer a unique way of defining a power that gives the true
discovery rate because the true discovery rate will, in general, be different for each of the
model configuration in the alternative hypothesis,
βθ = 1−
∫
Y
dy pi(y | θ) p(y), θ 6= 0.
If Θ is one-dimensional then we can visualize the sensitivity of the p-values as a function
of θ (Figure 8). When Θ is two-dimensional we can no longer visualize the full variation of
the sensitivity distribution, but we can visualize the variation of a summary statistic such
as the power (Figure 9). Visualizations allow us to identify regions in the alternative model
configuration space of high power, but they do not define a unique power or true discovery
rate for the test.
One immediate strategy is to define an overall power is to consider the minimum power
over all of the model configurations in the alternative hypothesis,
β ≡ min
θ 6=0
βθ.
Provided that we could accurately compute the minimum, this definition would ensure
that the overall power lower bounds the true discovery rate for all model configurations in
the alternative hypothesis. Unfortunately, when the null hypothesis is nested within the
alternative hypothesis the power can become arbitrarily small for the alternative model
configurations in the neighborhood around the lone null model configuration. Consequently
in practice we will generally be able to claim calibrated discoveries only for a subset of the
data generating processes in the alternative hypothesis.
In order to visualize how the power varies with the phenomenological parameters, ϑ,
we might also consider defining conditional powers. If the parameters partition into (ϑ, σ),
with ϑ ∈ $(Θ) and σ ∈ $(Θ)C , then we could define the conditional power as
βϑ = 1− max
σ∈$(Θ)C
∫
Y
dy pi(y | ϑ, σ) p(y).
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Fig 8. When the model configuration space is one-dimensional we can visualize the sensitivity of the null
p-values for each of the model configurations in the alternative hypothesis, θ 6= 0. This allows us to quickly
communicate the distribution of (a) the null p-values, p(y) or the equivalent (b) standard scores z(y) =
Φ−1(1− p(y)). Here the distributions are summarized with their medians in dark red and with the quartiles
in light red. In particular we can identify which θ in the alternative hypothesis achieve a given true discovery
rate, here 0.999, by seeing where the central value of the distributions surpass a dashed line.
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Fig 9. When the model configuration space is two-dimensional we can visualize how the power, βθ, varies
with the model configurations in the alternative hypothesis, here (θ1, θ2) 6= (0, 1). As in the one-dimensional
case we can vary the decoration to identify those model configurations achieving a given true discovery rate,
here 0.999, shown in red.
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Because the optimization of the nuisance parameters, σ, may be infeasible, profile likelihood
methods are often utilized to approximate the conditional powers for visualization. As with
any application of asymptotics, the validity of this approximations must be carefully verified
for the visualization to be useful.
Finally we might acknowledge the conceptual advantage of having dual point hypotheses
and consider not one null hypothesis test but rather an infinite number of tests, where each
tests is defined with respect to the point null hypothesis θ = 0, and one of the alternative
model configurations, θ′ 6= 0. When we reject the null hypothesis we reject it for any of the
alternatives. The preponderance of alternative hypotheses, however, significantly increases
the false discovery rate unless we apply a multiple comparison correction to the significance
threshold. This increase in the false discovery rate by separating the alternative hypothesis
into many point hypothesis is also known as the “look elsewhere effect” in particle physics.
4.2.3 Complex Hypotheses Unsurprisingly, implementing null hypothesis significance test-
ing becomes all the more difficult when neither the null hypothesis nor the alternative hy-
pothesis are point hypotheses. Given the influence of systematic and environmental factors
present in any experiment we rarely if ever enjoy point hypotheses when using realistic
models.
When there are multiple model configurations in the null hypothesis we have to consider
them all. For example we might define the p-value to be the smallest tail probability across
all of the null model configurations,
p(y˜) = min
θ∈Θ1
∫ ∞
y˜
dy pi(y | θ).
If we then reject the null when this minimal p-value is less than 1−α then the false discovery
rate will be at least α for every data generating process in the null hypothesis.
Power and true discover rate calculations proceed as above, with all of the potential
complications.
In this general case the computation of the optima needed to bound the false and true
discovery rates becomes a particularly significant computational burden that must be ad-
dressed with a careful combination of principled assumptions and approximations.
4.2.4 The Likelihood Ratio Test One of the difficulties with the null hypothesis signifi-
cance testing framework presented so far is the need to compute tail probabilities over the
measurement space. When the measurement space is more than a few dimensions these
tail probabilities are difficult to accurately approximate even with substantial computa-
tional resources available. A better strategy is to construct a lower-dimensional summary
of the measurement space that captures the differences between the null and alternative
hypotheses while admitting tests that are easier to implement.
Perhaps the most ubiquitous summary for testing is the likelihood ratio
λ(y˜) =
maxθ∈Θ1 pi(y˜ | θ)
maxθ∈Θ pi(y˜ | θ) ,
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which admits the likelihood ratio test where we reject the null hypothesis if λ(y˜) < λ0 for
some 0 < λ0 < 1.
The false and true discovery rates of the likelihood ratio test intimately depend on the
threshold, λ0, and the particular structure of the model configuration space. Consequently
without further assumptions the likelihood ratio test has to be explicitly calibrated for
every application.
The assumption of asymptotics, however, admits an analytic calibration of the likelihood
ratio test. Wilk’s Theorem demonstrates that, under the typical asymptotic conditions, the
distribution of the logarithm of the likelihood ratio with respect to the model configurations
in the null hypothesis asymptotically approaches a χ2 distribution,
−2 log λ ∼ χ2K ,
with degrees of freedom,
K = dim(Θ)− dim(Θ1).
Consequently the false discovery rate for a given threshold, −2 log λ0, can be calculated by
looking up the corresponding χ2K tail probability.
Indeed theoretical analysis shows that the likelihood ratio test is the optimal test in this
asymptotic regime. Many popular tests that have been developed in applied fields, such
as the Feldman-Cousins test (Feldman and Cousins, 1998), are actually instances of the
likelihood ratio test for specific classes of models.
4.3 Bayesian Model Comparison
Bayesian model comparison is an immediate consequence of extending a probabilistic
treatment to the absence and presence partitions of the model configuration space. Given
that it’s not conceptually more difficult, however, let’s consider the more general case where
we are interested in selecting between one of N models, {M1, . . . ,Mn}.
Each model configuration space can have different dimensions, but integrating the pa-
rameters out of the corresponding Bayesian joint distribution gives a marginal likelihood
over the common measurement space,
pi(y | Mn) =
∫
Θ
dθ pi(y, θ | Mn)
=
∫
Θ
dθ pi(y | θ,Mn)pi(θ | Mn)
= Epi(θ|Mn)[pi(y | θ,Mn)].
The marginal likelihood is also often known as the Bayes factor or evidence in some fields.
Given the marginal likelihoods we can construct a joint distribution over the measure-
ment and model spaces,
pi(y,Mn) = pi(y | Mn)pi(Mn),
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from which Bayes’ Theorem gives the model posteriors,
pi(Mn | y˜) = pi(y˜,Mn)
pi(y˜)
=
pi(y˜ | Mn)pi(Mn)∑N
n′=1 pi(y˜ | M′n)pi(M′n)
.
In particular, given only two models, M1 and M2, we are immediately guided to select
the first when it exhibits a higher model posterior density,
pi(M1 | y˜) > pi(M2 | y˜)
pi(y˜ | M1)pi(M1)∑N
n′=1 pi(y˜ | M′n)pi(M′n)
>
pi(y˜ | M2)pi(M2)∑N
n′=1 pi(y˜ | M′n)pi(M′n)
pi(y˜ | M1)pi(M1) > pi(y˜ | M2)pi(M2)
pi(y˜ | M1)
pi(y˜ | M2) >
pi(M2)
pi(M1) .
In words, we select M1 when the odds ratio, pi(y˜ | M1) / pi(y˜ | M2), surpasses a threshold
defined by the the relative prior probabilities of the two models, pi(M2)/pi(M1). Interest-
ingly this procedure resembles the likelihood ratio test where we use marginal likelihoods
instead of maximum likelihoods and the testing threshold is constructed from our prior
distributions.
Calibration of this Bayesian model selection then proceeds as with the calibration of any
Bayesian inference or decision making processs.
1. We first sample a true model from the model prior,
Mn˜ ∼ pi(Mn).
2. Then we sample a true model configuration from the subsequent prior distribution,
θ˜ ∼ pi(θ | Mn˜).
3. Next we sample an observation from that model configuration,
y˜ ∼ pi(y | θ˜,Mn˜),
4. Finally we calculate the marginal likelihoods to inform model selection,
pi(y˜ | Mn),
and estimate the corresponding discovery rates for each model,
RMn|Mn′ ≈
][ Select Mn given observation from Mn′ ]
][ Observations from Mn′ ] .
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In particular, if we define MA as the absence model and MP as the presence model
then the false discovery rate is estimated as
FDR ≈ ][ Select MP given observation from MA]
][ Observations from MA] .
with the true discovery rate estimated as
TDR ≈ ][ Select MP given observation from MP ]
][ Observations from MP ] .
In cases like this where there are only a few models being considered it may also be easier
to condition on each model and compute the corresponding discovery rates one at a time
instead of sampling a model at each iteration.
Marginal likelihoods and Bayesian model selection arise immediately once we consider
probabilities over the set of models. Unfortunately the theoretical elegance of this approach
does not always translate into practical utility.
First and foremost the marginal likelihood is extremely challenging to estimate, even in
relatively simple problems. The structure of the integral frustrates typical computational
tools like Markov chain Monte Carlo and necessitates more complex, and less well estab-
lished, tools like nested sampling and simulated tempering. Unfortunately these methods
are poorly understood relative to the more established tools and consequently their imple-
mentations are still limited by our modest understanding. In particular, quantification of
the accuracy of these methods is typically limited to only heuristics.
Beyond the computational issues, however, is a more subtle conceptual issue. The marginal
likelihood evaluates a model by comparing a given observation to all of the model config-
urations in the model configuration space, each weighted by only the prior distribution.
Consequently even the smallest details of the prior distribution can significantly affect the
marginal likelihood.
This is in stark contrast to the effect of the prior distribution on the posterior distri-
bution. Here the likelihood reduces the influence of model configurations inconsistent with
an observation, obscuring much of the structure of the prior distribution. Even seemingly
irrelevant details of the prior distribution will still strongly affect the marginal likelihoods,
and the practice of constructing prior distributions to ensure only well-behaved posteriors
is grossly insufficient for ensuring meaningful marginal likelihoods (Gelman, Simpson and
Betancourt, 2017).
In practice the sensitivity of the marginal likelihoods, and hence Bayesian model selec-
tion, to the intricate details of the prior distribution manifests in strong dependencies on
the observation and a fragility in the corresponding model selection. Small changes in the
observation can cause significant changes in the marginal likelihoods, with the decision
making process rapidly vacillating amongst the possible models. Fortunately this behavior
will manifest in sensitivity analyses and poor false discovery rates and true discovery rates
and so it can be quantified provided that the test is calibrated!
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4.4 Posterior Probability of The Region of Practical Equivalence
One of the implicit difficulties in informing discovery claims as presented so far is that the
absence model is singular with respect to the full model configuration space – the absence
model configuration space and the presence model configuration spaces are of different
dimensionality. Because of this the posterior probability for all of the model configurations
in the absence will always be zero for a prior that is continuous across the full model
configuration space. The only way to admit non-zero posterior probabilities over both
models is to assign infinitely more prior probability to those model configurations in the
absence model relative to those in the presence model.
Bayesian model comparison avoids this issue by comparing only marginal likelihoods
and avoiding the individual model posteriors altogether. We can inform a discovery claim
using only the posterior over the full model configuration space, however, if we absorb some
of the presence model into the absence model. In particular, those model configurations
in the presence model close to those in the absence model will generate nearly identical
observations and hence indistinguishable inferences; an infinitesimally weak phenomenon
will be impossible to differentiate from no phenomenon without an impractical amount of
data.
This suggests that we redefine our absence model as
Θ1 = {θ ∈ Θ | |ϑ(θ)| ≤ ϑ0} ,
with the presence model becoming
Θ2 = {θ ∈ Θ | |ϑ(θ)| > ϑ0} ,
for some threshold ϑ0. The neighborhood around the absence model configurations, |ϑ(θ)| ≤
ϑ0, is known as the region of practical equivalence (Kruschke, 2014). Notice that separating
model configurations close to ϑ = 0 from the presence model is not entirely dissimilar in
what we had to do when considering the power of a complex alternative model in null
hypothesis significance testing.
With this modification of the absence model we can then claim a discovery when the
posterior probability in the region of practical equivalence is below a given threshold,∫ ϑ0
−ϑ0
dθ pi(ϑ | y˜) < 1− α,
where pi(ϑ | y˜) is the marginal posterior over the phenomenological parameters.
I have defined the formal decision making process here to superficially resemble that used
in null hypothesis significance testing, but we could just as easily use the complementary
situation where the posterior probability outside the region of practical equivalence is above
the given threshold, ∫ −ϑ0
−∞
dθ pi(ϑ | y˜) +
∫ ∞
ϑ0
dθ pi(ϑ | y˜) > 1− α.
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Calibration of this method, in particular the estimation of the false discovery rate and
true discovery rate, immediately follows from the Bayesian calibration paradigm.
1. We first sample a true model configuration from the prior distribution over the model
configuration space,
θ˜ ∼ pi(θ).
2. Next we sample an observation from that model configuration,
y˜ ∼ pi(y | θ˜),
3. Finally we reconstruct the posterior probability of the absence model,
P =
∫ ϑ0
−ϑ0
dϑpi(ϑ | y˜).
The false discovery rate follows as
FDR ≈ ][P ≤ 1− α and |$(θ˜)| < ϑ0]
][|$(θ˜)| < ϑ0]
,
with the true discovery rate,
TDR ≈ ][P ≤ 1− α and |$(θ˜)| > ϑ0
][|$(θ˜)| > ϑ0]
.
By sampling from various conditional priors we can also quantify how the false and
true discovery rates, or even the distribution of P itself, varies with respect to various
parameters. This allows us to visualize the sensitivity of the experiment similar to Figure
8, only for arbitrarily complicated models (Figure 10).
4.5 Predictive Scores
Lastly we can select a model and claim discovery or no discovery by comparing the
predictive performance of the possible hypotheses. Here we use our inferences to construct a
predictive distribution for new data and then select the model whose predictive distribution
is closest to the true data generating process.
Predictive distributions arise naturally in many forms of inference. For example, the
model configuration identified by a frequentist point estimator defines the predictive dis-
tribution
piP = pi(y | θˆ(y˜)).
Bayesian inference immediately yields two predictive distributions: the prior predictive
distribution,
piP = pi(y) =
∫
Θ
dθ pi(y | θ)pi(θ),
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Fig 10. By sampling from a conditional joint distribution, pi(σ | ϑ), we can visualize the sensitivity of
the distribution of absence model posterior probabilities with respect to a phenomenological parameter, ϑ.
The average of this distribution, shown here in dark red, gives the conditional false discovery rate. Given
a desired false discovery rate, here 10−3, we can then identify for which phenomenological parameters we
expect a discovery on average, shown here in grey.
and the posterior predictive distribuiton,
piP = pi(y | y˜) =
∫
Θ
dθ pi(y | θ)pi(θ | y˜).
Regardless of how a predictive distribution is constructed, it’s similarity to the true data
generating process, pi∗, is defined by the Kullback-Leibler divergence,
KL(piP || pi∗) =
∫
Y
dy pi∗(y) log
pi∗(y)
piP (y)
=
∫
Y
dy pi∗(y) log pi∗(y)−
∫
Y
dy pi∗(y) log piP (y).
Because the first term is the same for all models, the relative predictive performance be-
tween models is quantified by the predictive score,
S = −
∫
Y
dy pi∗(y) log piP (y).
This expectation with respect to the true data generating process cannot be calcu-
lated without already knowing the true data generating process, but predictive scores can
be approximated using observations which, by construction, are drawn from that distri-
bution. Different approximation methods combined with various predictive distributions
yield a host of predictive model comparison techniques, ranging from cross validation to
the Akaike Information Criterion, to the Bayesian Information Criterion, to Bayesian cross
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validation, the Widely Applicable Information Criterion, and the Deviance Information
Criterion (Betancourt, 2015).
Error in these approximations, however, can be quite large and difficult to quantify in
practice, leading to poorly calibrated selection between the absence model and the presence
model. Consequently it is critically important to estimate their expected false discovery
rate and true discovery rate using the assumed model. In the frequentist settings these
rates can be quantified as the minimal performance across the model configurations in the
absence and presence models, where as in the Bayesian setting these rates can be quantified
by their expected performance over the Bayesian joint distribution.
5. APPLICATIONS TO LIMIT SETTING
Limit setting is a complement to claiming discovery when the experiment is not expected
to be sufficiently sensitive to the relevant phenomenon. Instead of claiming a discovery we
consider how strongly we can constrain the magnitude of that phenomenon and calibrate
the corresponding constraint with respect to the absence model. Because limit setting is
derived from standard inference methods, its implementation is significantly more straight-
forward than the implementation of discovery claims.
5.1 Frequentist Limit Setting with Anchored Confidence Intervals
In the frequentist setting we can constrain the magnitude of a phenomenon by construct-
ing confidence intervals than span from a vanishing phenomenon to some upper limit. More
formally, if the magnitude of the phenomenon is positive, so that the absence model is de-
fined by ϑ = 0 and the absence model is defined by ϑ > 0, then we construct an anchored
confidence interval of the form
[
0, ϑˆ(y)
)
that has a given coverage, α, with respect to the
full model.
Given an observation, y˜, we then claim that ϑ < ϑˆ(y˜) with confidence α. The sensitivity
of this claim is defined with respect to the possible distribution of ϑˆ(y) with respect to
the data generating process in the absence model. For one and two-dimensional absence
models the sensitivity can be visualized using the same techniques in Section 4.2.2.
5.2 Bayesian Limit Setting with Posterior Quantiles
The frequentist approach to limit setting has an immediate Bayesian analogue where we
use posterior quantiles to bound the magnitude of the phenomenon.
For a given credibility, α, we define the upper limit, ϑα as
ϑα(y˜) =
{
ϑ |
∫ ϑ
0
dϑpi(ϑ | y˜) = 1− α}.
By defining the limit in terms of the marginal posterior for the phenomenological parame-
ters, ϑ, we automatically incorporate the uncertainty in any nuisance parameters into the
bound.
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The corresponding sensitivity follows by considering the distribution ϑα with respect to
the Bayesian joint distribution for the absence model.
1. We first sample a true model configuration from the absence model by sampling the
nuisance parameters from the conditional prior distribution,
σ˜ ∼ pi(σ | ϑ = 0)
θ˜ = (0, σ˜) .
2. Next we sample an observation from that model configuration,
y˜ ∼ pi(y | θ˜),
3. Finally we compute the inferred upper bound,
ϑα(y˜) =
{
ϑ |
∫ ϑ
0
dϑpi(ϑ | y˜) = 1− α}.
6. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE DIRECTIONS
Both the frequentist and Bayesian perspectives admit procedures for analyzing sensitivi-
ties and calibrating decision making processes. Implementing these calibrations in practice,
however, is far from trivial.
Frequentist calibration requires bounding the expectation of a given loss function over
all of the data generating processes in a given model, or partitions thereof. The deriva-
tion of analytic bounds from assumptions about the structure of the model configuration
space and the loss function, especially those derived from asymptotic analyses, is greatly
facilitated with the presumption of simple model configuration spaces. Numerical methods
for computing the bounds are also aided by simple models. The probabilistic computa-
tions required of Bayesian calibration are often more straightforward to approximate but
sufficiently complex models will eventually frustrate even the most advanced Bayesian
computational methods. In practice these computational challenges result in a dangerous
tension between models that are simple enough to admit accurate calibrations and models
that are complex enough for their resulting calibrations to be relevant to the experiment
being analyzed.
The continued improvement in computational resources and algorithms has gradually
reduced, and promises to continue to reduce, this tension. Monte Carlo and Markov chain
Monte Carlo methods, for example, have revolutionized our ability to compute expected
losses and Bayesian posterior expectations over high-dimensional measurement and model
configuration spaces. Unfortunately the applicability of this method critically depends on
the desired calibration. In particular, the square root convergence of Monte Carlo estima-
tors is often too slow to ensure accurate calibration of rare observations. This frustrates
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the calculation, for example, of the O(1 − 10−7) significance thresholds presumed in con-
temporary particle physics. Computational limitations restrain not only the complexity of
our models but also the complexity of the loss function we consider.
Statistics is a constant battle between computational feasibility and compatibility with
analysis goals. Ultimately it is up to the practitioner to exploit their domain expertise to
identify compromises that facilitate high-performance decision making.
Finally there is the issue of experimental design where we tune the design of an exper-
iment to achieve a given performance. As difficult as it is to compute this performance,
“inverting” the calibration to identify the optimal experiment is even harder. For com-
plex models that don’t admit analytic results, contemporary best practice often reduces to
exploring the experiment design space heuristically, guided by computed calibrations and
domain expertise.
An interesting future direction is the use of automatic differentiation methods to au-
tomatically estimate not only the expected losses but also their gradients with respect to
the experimental design. Although an imposing implementation challenge, these gradients
have the potential to drastically improve the exploration and optimization of experimental
designs.
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